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Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other
Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof
Calvin W. Sharpe *
We are tending more and more toward an appreciation of the truth that,
after all, there are few rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees...
So also the duty of a judge becomes itself a question of degree, and he is a
usefuijudge or a poor one as he estimates the measure accuratey or loosely. t
I. Introduction
Admitting evidence of a criminal defendant's crimes or bad acts
other than those with which he is currently charged (referred to in
this article as "other crimes," ''extrinsic acts," ".other acts," or "un-
charged offenses") raises hard questions for courts.' A number of le-
gal scholars have given thoughtful attention to these questions.
2
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article.
t B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161-62 (1921).
I Such evidence need not have resulted in conviction in order to be admissible. R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1982); 2 D. LoUI-
SELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140, at 121 (1978). However, there must be
some evidence connecting the defendant with the other crime. Evidence of other crimes, acts,
or wrongs to prove character and conforming conduct normally carries moral overtones.
Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV.
777, 779 & n.7 (1981). This evidence need not be crimes. It may simply be other acts not
constituting criminal activity. See United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 966-67 (11th Cir.
1982). For convenience, this article will refer to the variety of other crimes, acts, or wrongs
collectively as "other crimes."
2 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 215-31; G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 124-46 (1938); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 140,
at 113-45; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 190-191 (2d ed. 1972);
S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 132-56 (3d ed. 1982);
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[08]-[21] (1982); 22 C. WRIGHT
& K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5239-5250, at 427-551 (1978);
Carter, The Admissibility of Evidence of Simnilar Facts, 70 LAW Q. REV. 214, 229 (1954); Kuhns,
supra note 1, at 777; Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 OR.
L. REV. 267 (1952); Payne, The Law Whose Lfe is Not Logic: Evidence of Other Crimes in Criminal
Cases, 3 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 62 (1968); Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV.
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE
They have been concerned about the tendency of other crimes evi-
dence to prejudice a defendant unfairly and detract from the
factfinder's dispassionate consideration of the issues.3 Yet they recog-
nize that such evidence may be important, sometimes even necessary,
to enable the prosecution to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
4
Courts and legislatures also have recognized the need for and
the dangers of evidence of other crimes and have attempted to steer a
middle course between acceptance and rejection. Both the Federal
Rules of Evidence5 and the common law generally make other crimes
evidence inadmissible to show that the defendant's character is itself
circumstantial evidence that he committed the charged offense; but
they may admit it if offered for other purposes.6 When offered for
325 (1956); Stone, The Rule of Excuion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988
(1938); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevanq--A Conflict in Theoy, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385 (1952);
Weissenberger, Character Evidence Under the Federal Rules: A Puzzle With Missing Pieces, 48 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Comment, Rule 404(6) Other Crimes Evidence: The Need for a Two-Step
Analysir, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 634 (1976); Note, Proof of Pi'or Act Evidence, 49 U. CIN. L. REv.
613 (1980); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Tral Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J.
763 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Other Crimes Evidence].
This article deals only with offers of other crimes evidence by the prosecutor against a
defendant in a criminal case under the Federal Rules of Evidence. While Rule 404(b) is not
limited to criminal cases, most of the proof problems addressed by this approach arise in that
context. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, SUpra note 1, at 136-37, 151-52. The applicability
of other crimes evidence against a criminal defendant's witnesses, prosecution witnesses, and
in civil cases is not specifically considered in this article.
3 .United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044-48 (5th Cir. 1977); R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG,.supra note 1, at 215-3 1; 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[25]-[35].
4 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
5 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
6 Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
This rule is deemed to be a codification of the common-law approach to the admissibility
of other crimes evidence. That approach recognized the inherent prejudice attached to such
evidence-the danger that juries would misuse it to weigh testimony based on character (a
process that may result in conviction of a defendant because of his bad character) or would
misconstrue its probative value. See Comment, supra note 2. Common-law approaches to
other crimes evidence were either inclusionary or exclusionary. The former admitted such
evidence for any relevant purpose except to prove character in order to show that a person
acted in conformity therewith. The latter excluded all other crimes evidence for any purpose
except those specified within the rule, usually the same as the examples set forth in Rule
404(b). There is considerable agreement that the only potential difference between the two
approaches is that under the inclusionary approach the trial judge may more carefully ana-
lyze the proffered evidence for a relevant non-character purpose, while the exclusionary ap-
proach encourages labeling as a substitute for analysis and results in the "smuggling" in of
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non-character purposes, other crimes evidence may still be excluded
if the trial judge, balancing the evidence's probative value against its
potential unfair prejudice, finds it unduly prejudicial.
7
One of the several factors in any balancing is the probability
that the other crime actually occurred.8 In assessing this factor,
courts have disagreed on how strong the proof of another offense
must be to admit it. Even adoption of evidence codes like the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence has not ended the debate.9 Federal courts still
use different standards to rule on the admissibility of other acts evi-
dence. 10 One circuit has held that only "sufficient evidence" to per-
mit a jury finding that the other crime occurred need be shown."
Another has held that other crimes must be proved by a "preponder-
ance of the evidence."' 2 Others have held that such evidence should
be "clear and convincing";13 and one circuit has been interpreted to
require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."1
4
other crimes evidence to show character and conforming conduct. See R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 215-19; Slough, supra note 2; see also S. SALTZBURG & K. RED-
DEN, supra note 2, at 128. Rule 404(b) adopts the inclusionary approach. Comment, supra
note 2, at 636-39; see United States v. DeVaughan, 601 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1979).
7 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978). Rule 403 requires judges to
balance the probative value of evidence against its potential harm:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
For an excellent discussion of the general application of Rule 403, see Dolan, Rule 1(03. The
Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220 (1976).
8 See text accompanying note 38 infra.
9 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[10], at 404-55 to 404-62; Dolan,
supra note 7, at 234. The rules were enacted on Jan. 2, 1975. See S. SALTZBURG & K. RED-
DEN, supra note 2, at 1-6 for a short history of the codification of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
10 See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 140, at 118; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 2, 404[10], at 404-55 to 404-62; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 2, § 5250, at 548. See McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belif Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293 (1982) for a challenge to the imprecision and
proliferation of "burden of proof" language.
11 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir. 1978). Other circuits have
followed the Fifth Circuit's lead. See, e.g., United States v. Chilcote, 725 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir.
1984).
12 See United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1975).
13 United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bowman,
602 F.2d 160, 164 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106-07 (7th Cir.
1979); Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889, 892 (6th Cir. 1974).
14 See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 404-57 (citing United States v.
Testa, 548 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1977)). At least one commentator has suggested that the stan-
dards should vary depending upon whether the litigation is criminal or civil. See Froncek,
Proof of Prior Act Evidence, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 613 (1980).
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This article explores the rationale for the rules that determine
when other crimes evidence will be admitted and argues that the
potential for unfair prejudice is the primary reason for extreme cau-
tion in admitting such evidence. It then analyzes the concepts of
unfair prejudice and probative value and argues that the levels of
unfair prejudice associated with differing uses of other crimes evi-
dence should dictate how strong the proof of the crime must be to
satisfy the balancing approach of Rule 403.15 Finally, this article
suggests that no single standard of proof fits all cases but that a slid-
ing scale is needed to give judges the appropriate flexibility in ruling
on the admissibility of other crimes evidence.
II. Rules and Rationale
Rule 404(a) provides that character evidence is generally not ad-
missible as circumstantial evidence of a conforming act. 16 This codi-
fies the common-law approach, which excludes character evidence
because it is both not very probative of conforming conduct (it does
not create a very strong inference) and because it is likely to be mis-
used by the factfinder.' 7 Character evidence is also thought to in-
15 See note 7 supra.
16 Rule 404(a) provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his char-
acter is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609.
The exceptions under Rule 404(a) reflect consideration of litigation needs, reduced
prejudice, and fairness to the litigants. The first suggests that favorable character evidence is
not likely to be damaging to the government's chance for a fair trial, whereas negative evi-
dence offered against a defendant is likely to threaten a fair trial on the crime charged.
Notwithstanding the exceptions set forth under Rule 404(a), the use of character evidence is
narrowly circumscribed. Even its use by a defendant is restricted to pertinent character traits.
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee notes; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at
236-45; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 191, at 454-59; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra
note 2, at 124-25.
17 This circumscription of the utility of character evidence generally is based on the rec-
ognition that such evidence
is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. . . [inasmuch as] it tends
to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the
particular occasion [in question in the trial]. . . . It subtly permits the trier of fact
[Vol. 59:556]
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volve the dangers of arousing the jury's passions, thereby detracting
from a rational consideration of the evidence as a whole, needlessly
consuming time, and risking unfair surprise to the defendant. 18
The probative value of all character evidence, including evi-
dence of other crimes, is often not very great, while it usually will
have substantial prejudicial effects. 19 Consider, for example, a de-
fendant on trial for murdering an auto mechanic with a handgun.
He denies having been in town on the day of the murder. The prose-
cutor may seek to introduce evidence that the defendant robbed a
bank in the same town two months earlier. This evidence has very
low relevance, since it is not helpful on the identity issue in the mur-
der case. The most it shows is that the defendant had committed a
crime and was in town two months before the charged offense. Since
many people who commit one crime never commit a second, the pro-
to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.
6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP., REC. & STUDIES 615 (1964); Stone, supra note 2; see
FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee note; see also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note
1, at 217-21; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 447, 454.
The component of "probative value" referred to here is the degree of persuasiveness. It
might reasonably be said that a person is only slightly less likely to act out of character rather
than in what another understands to be his character. The distinction behind the predictabil-
ity of behavior based on perceived character traits (deemed to be low) and that based upon
habitual conduct (deemed to be high) underlies the different treatment of character and habit
under Rules 404 and 406. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 462-65; see als Kuhns, supra note
1, at 779-80 nn.9-10.
18 IA J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 57, at 1180-85 (Tillers rev. 1983). If the common law was con-
cerned that the blunt edge of general character evidence produced the dangers of arousing,
confusing, and distracting the jury, consuming time, and risk of surprise, it was alarmed
about the sharp potential of specific criminal acts to produce even greater dangers. C. MC-
CORMICK, supra note 2, § 186, at 442-43. Reputation evidence was deemed to have a lesser
tendency to arouse, distract, consume time, or risk surprise than evidence of opinion or spe-
cific instances. See 1A J. WIGMORE, Supra, § 58.2, at 1212. But see C. MCCORMICK, supra note
2, § 186, at 443, criticizing the relevant sections in Wigmore. These limitations on the man-
ner of proof of character have been carried forward in Rule 405.
19 See note 18 supra; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 217-19; C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 2, at 442-43. For a thoughtful analysis of the use in Rule 404(b) of the
concept of character in determining the admissibility of specific acts evidence, see Kuhns,
supra note 1, at 804, 809.
Note that the defendant's right in a criminal case to introduce evidence that would cre-
ate a reasonable doubt, e.g., evidence of his own good character, or in a homicide case evi-
dence of the character of the victim to show he was the first aggressor, is the policy behind
Rule 404(a) (1) and (2). See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, SUpra note 2, at 125. The rule does
not apply when character is an element of the crime, claim, or defense. In these cases Rule
405(b) governs admissibility. Also, no exception to the ban on the substantive use of charac-
ter evidence is made for civil cases. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee note.
[1984]
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bative value of this evidence by itself is low,20 and the two-month
time gap between the uncharged and charged offenses makes the evi-
dence of little value to prove opportunity. Further, the evidence car-
ries all the dangers of unfair prejudice identified at common law. It
may cause the jury to regard the defendant as a bad person, the kind
of person who makes a vocation of committing crimes,2' and to con-
clude that he should be punished even if there is only weak evidence
connecting him with the charged murder. If the defendant was not
convicted of the bank robbery, the power of this inference of bad
character may be enhanced by the jury's sense of retribution, i.e., its
desire to sanction the defendant for another crime he seems to have
"got away with."'22 A subtler result may be that the jury will be less
willing to listen to the defendant's evidence or may have fewer
scruples about making a wrong decision.
23
If the uncharged robbery has not been the subject of criminal
prosecution and the defendant disputes his guilt or involvement,
presenting evidence of whether he committed the robbery may be so
20 See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, SUPra note 1, at 218 n.49; J. MONAHAN, PREDICT-
ING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 95-128 (1981).
21 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 58.2, at 1212; Gold, Federal Rule ofEvidence 403.- Obser-
vations on the Nature of Unfairly Prfudical Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 524-30 (1983); see
Stone, supra note 2, at 998.
In explaining Rule 403, which requires that probative value be balanced against unfair
prejudice, the Advisory Committee Note states:
The case law recognized that certain circumstances call for the exclusion of
evidence which is of unquestioned relevance. These circumstances entail risks which
range all the way from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis, at one ex-
treme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting time, at the other extreme.
Situations in this area call for balancing the probative value of and need for the
evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission. [Citations omitted].
The rules which follow in this Article are concrete applications evolved for particu-
lar situations. However, they reflect the policies underlying the present rule, which
is designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have
been formulated.
Rule 404(b), one of the relevance rules alluded to in the foregoing excerpt, is based on the
assumption that other crimes evidence is inherently prejudicial. See C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 190, at 447; Weinstein, Federal Relevany Rules, 4 GA. L. REV. 43, 86-87 (1969).
Traditionally, 404(b)-type rules have been characterized as excluding evidence of a propen-
sity to commit the act in question. Professor Kuhns challenges the adequacy of the propen-
sity concept to rationalize admissibility decisions in the other crimes area. Kuhns, supra note
1.
22 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 219.
23 Note, Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 2, at 773-74. This effect may also be thought of
as altering the jury's regret matrix. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, 162-65;
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1021, 1032-41 (1977) (and cases cited therein).
[Vol. 59:556]
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protracted as to become a trial within a trial.2 4 The jury may be
distracted by the "inner trial" and confuse the issues, or take their
conclusion that the defendant committed the robbery as proof that
he committed the murder.2 5 A detailed presentation of the robbery
might overemphasize its prejudicial aspects, making it both less help-
ful to the jury and less susceptible to clear evaluation.
2 6
Although the robbery may have little if any relevance to the
murder, the jury may overestimate the weight of the other crime and
conclude that since the defendant committed a robbery, he is sub-
stantially more likely to have committed the murder.2 7 This problem
of misestimation is exacerbated if the other crime is the same or simi-
lar to the charged offense, for example, another murder.2 8 Further, if
the prosecutor gives no notice of his intention to introduce evidence
of another crime, the defendant might be surprised and unable to
mount an effective defense.2 9 All these dangers associated with other
crimes evidence lead to one essential harm: an influence on the jury
verdict that is not attributable to the probative force of the evidence
concerning the charged crime. 30 The result may be an unfair convic-
24 See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 188-89, 219; 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5250, at 549.
25 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 188-89; Dolan, supra note 7, at 238-40;
Note, Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 2.
26 See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 92-99, for a discussion of how the manner of present-
ing the evidence may raise or lower the prejudice involved. See United States v. Ostrowsky,
501 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1974)(showing how counsel's overly detailed presentation of the evi-
dence led to a finding of prejudice); see also United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir.
1981); People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33 (1968).
27 This kind of prejudice is often referred to as misleading the jury. See People v. Collins,
68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33 (1968); Dolan, supra note 7, at 237-42; Weinstein, Some Diftiulties
in Devising Ru/esfor Determining Truth injudicial Trials, 66 CoLUM. L. REy. 223 (1966). See J.
MONAHAN, supra note 20, at 95-128, for an excellent study of the predictive value of other
crimes evidence.
Whatever the true probability that commission of a crime will be followed by other
criminal acts, it is highly unlikely that the aggregate intuitions of a jury will produce an
accurate assessment of the worth of such evidence. Furthermore, even if statistics indicating
the probability of a second theft, given a first, were available, a jury's ability to ascribe to such
evidence only its properly proportioned weight is highly questionable. See R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 160-62, 219.
28 See note 48 infra.
29 See United States v. Jones, 570 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978), which presented such a prob-
lem. In that case a physician was prosecuted for unlawfully distributing quaalude, a con-
trolled drug. The prosecutor introduced evidence that the physician distributed the same or
similar drug on 478 other occasions. The court noted that the defendant was prejudiced,
inter alia, by his inability to respond to the numerous charges.
30 A shorthand term I use for the dangers discussed in the text and specifically set forth in
Rule 403 is "unfair prejudice." "Prejudice" means only harmful effect, while "unfair
prejudice" means that the evidence not only has significant impact on the defendant's case
[1984]
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE
tion of a criminal defendant.
The persuasiveness of other crimes evidence is deemed to be
higher, however, when it is offered for a relevant, non-character pur-
pose than when it is offered to infer conduct from some character
trait which the other crimes evidence suggests.3 ' Thus if a defendant
denies having committed the murder for which he is on trial, the
prosecutor may introduce evidence that a week before the victim was
murdered, the defendant robbed the First National Bank; the victim
was a customer in the bank at the time of the robbery; the defendant
knew the victim before the robbery; and they exchanged glances dur-
ing the robbery. Such evidence creates a strong inference that the
defendant, and not someone else, committed the charged murder.
32
In this case, the evidence may nevertheless give rise to the prohibited
inference that the defendant is "a robber." Thus, no matter why the
other crimes evidence is offered, there always remains the chance
that it will indicate to a jury that the defendant is a particular kind
of person. Where the defendant's character is bad, the jury may be
distracted from the facts of the case and penalize him for being gen-
erally a bad person. For this reason, judges must be careful to bal-
ance probative value and prejudicial effect in the context of each
particular case.
A. Proof of Other Crines as a Function of Probative Value
The probative value33 of an item of circumstantial evidence is its
but also that its admission results in some unfairness to the defendant because of its non-
probative aspect. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 2, at 102 n.7; I J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER,supra note 2, 403[03], at 403-18 to 403-22; see also Gold,supra note 21, at 506-
10 (describing unfair prejudice as the tendency to cause the jury to commit inferential error).
In this article, "prejudice," "prejudicial" or prejudicial effects refers to the dangers of "unfair
prejudice" and the other policy counterweights of Rule 403.
31 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 220-22; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2,
§ 190, at 447-54; see also Kuhns, supra note 1, at 800; Note, Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 2,
at 769.
32 See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[14], at 404-78 to 404-80 (and
cases cited therein). For examples of permissible uses of other crimes evidence, see R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 235, and 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 2, 1 404[12], [16].
33 Where the other crime sought to be introduced is not the subject of a conviction, it is
not necessary to establish the defendant's participation in the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt-the standard that would be applied were the defendant being actually tried for the
other crime. Due process requires that each element of the offense in a criminal case be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Other crimes proof
under a lesser standard would present a problem only in the rare case where the other crimes
evidence constituted the only evidence on an element of the crime, e.g., intent in a theft case.
In those cases, the defendant probably would be entitled to a directed verdict if the prosecu-
[Vol. 59:5561
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tendency to make the existence of a relevant fact more or less likely
than it would be without the evidence. 34 Three factors affect the pro-
bative value of other crimes evidence. One is its relationship to other
evidence available to the prosecution. 35 If other evidence proves dis-
puted factual issues, one more piece of proof on the same issue may
have only low probative value. Thus the probative value of an item
of evidence turns in part on the evidence that precedes it.36
A second factor is the strength of the inference the factfinder is
asked to draw from the evidence of other crimes. Evidence in a mur-
der prosecution that the defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the
shooting with a smoking gun seconds after shots were heard will sup-
port a stronger inference of his guilt than evidence that he was a
beneficiary of the victim's life insurance policy.
3 7
A third factor affecting the probative value of other crimes evi-
dence is whether it is true.38 Did the defendant really run from the
scene seconds after the shooting with a smoking gun? Did he and the
victim actually have an argument shortly before the murder? If the
tor, in the absence of other evidence of intent, were unable to establish his commission of the
other crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
34 Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Consti-
tution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 438-39 n.30; Dolan, supra note 7, at 233-35.
35 See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1978); C. MCCoR-
MICK, supra note 2, at 439 n.30; Dolan, supra note 7, at 233-35. On the factor of need in Rule
403 balancing, see note 112 infra. See also 2 LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 140, at
116-17; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5250, at 546-47.
36 If the other crimes evidence has little incremental probative value, it will almost cer-
tainly be excluded under Rule 403 as disproportionately prejudicial. Conversely, other
crimes evidence is considered by many courts to be non-probative where offered to prove an
uncontested issue. See United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 1000 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see
also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[09], at 404-49 to 404-5 1.
37 The logical probative value of a relevant fact is affected by how inferentially remote
the fact is from the actual issue to be proved. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 439; 1 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 1 401[08]-[09], at 401-28 to 401-37; Dolan, supra note
7, at 233-35; James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 689, 694-99 (1941);
Slough, Relevang Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1956); Trautman, supra note 2, at 388-
92. See also United States v. Rubin Gonzales, 674 F.2d 1067, 1078 (5th Cir. 1982).
38 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 453; Note, Other Crimes Evidence, supra note
2, at 770. The Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1057 (5th Cir.
1981), that "[t]he probative value of extrinsic offense evidence may be measured by whether
and to what extent the accused's motive, intent, etc., are established by other evidence, stipu-
lation, or inference." See also 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 140, at 118; 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[ 10], at 404-55 to 404-62; 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5250, at 548; Dolan, supra note 7, at 233.
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evidence is false, it cannot support the inference for which it is of-
fered. If the evidence concerning the flight or the argument is un-
true, it would be impossible to infer from these statements that the
defendant was conscious of his guilt and therefore guilty, or had a
motive to kill the victim and therefore killed him.39 Naturally, a
factfinder rarely if ever will know with absolute certainty whether
evidence is true or false. Thus the question becomes how much proof
there must be that the other crimes evidence is true to warrant ad-
mitting it. This is the question that has caused so much difficulty.
The probative value of other crimes evidence, if the evidence is
true, diminishes as the probability decreases that the defendant actu-
ally committed the other crimes. Courts observing this relationship
speak of a "requisite degree of relevance"''4 or "reliability," 41 or of
something "reducing" 42 or "weakening" probative value.43 They
recognize that the probative value of other crimes evidence rises and
falls with the probability that the defendant actually committed the
extrinsic act.44
III. Two-Step Balancing to Achieve the Requisite Certainty
Assuming that other crimes evidence is probative of something
besides character and is not cumulative, it is prima facie admissible
under Rule 404(b). But it is also likely to be unfairly prejudicial.
39 See Lempert, supra note 23, at 1052 (discussing the diminished probative value of im-
peached testimony). Lack of reliability of other crimes evidence based on failure of proof
produces an analogous result.
40 United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1979)).
41 United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir. 1979).
42 United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1980).
43 United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376, 380 (9th Cir. 1979); see also 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 404-62 to 404-63. Probative value may also be referred
to as weight of the evidence. It is widely recognized that juries weigh evidence depending
upon their determination of the credibility of a witness. Thus, the testimony of an eyewitness
to a shooting who is shown through cross-examination to have lacked an opportunity ade-
quately to observe the shooting, or to harbor some intense disdain for the defendant, will be
assigned very little weight (or probative value) even though, if believed, it would seal the
prosecutor's case. See Lempert, supra note 23, at 1052-55. An identical weighing process is
performed by the judge in determining the probative value to be assigned to other crimes
evidence, The probative weight of such evidence turns on the certainty of the prosecutor's
proof that the defendant actually committed the other crime. Discounting of probative value
for lack of proof may be thought of as analogous to discrediting testimony where a witness has
demonstrated lack of trustworthiness.
44 See United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 1983), where the court
held that the vagueness of the proof of the other crimes made its reliability questionable and
diminished its probative value.
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Trial judges must balance the magnitude of probative value against
prejudicial effect to determine admissibility.45 This article's thesis is
that the balancing should be done in two steps. First, the judge
should balance under Rule 403 as though proof of the other crime
were certain. If it appears tentatively admissible, the judge should
then consider the degree to which the other crime has been proved
and strike a second, true balance between probative value and unfair
prejudice. This second step results in the ultimate determination of
admissibility.
A. Risk Unfair of Prejudice
In the first balancing step, other crimes evidence can be usefully
considered on a sliding scale of risk. High risk evidence consists of
egregiously offensive or particularly reprehensible acts that are cer-
tain to raise the ire of jurors and cause them to seek retribution.
46 It
carries great danger of unfair prejudice, because the jury is likely to
infer from the other crimes evidence that the defendant is a "mur-
derer," "robber," "rapist," or "drug pusher," and proceed to convict
him on evidence of his bad character rather than because the evi-
dence proves him guilty of the charged offense. More subtly, the "re-
gret matrix" may be altered because of the inflammatory nature of
the evidence, making the jury less concerned about reaching a wrong
verdict.4 7  Evidence of acts highly similar to those charged in the
pending criminal action also falls in the high risk range.48 When the
45 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 917 (5th Cir. 1978); FED. R. EVID. 403; C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 447; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 403-15 to
403-17; Dolan, supra note 7.
46 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 403-415 to 403-417; see also 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5250, at 548-49.
47 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 162-65, 218.
48 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914, 915 n.20 (5th Cir. 1978); 2 D. LOUISELL
& C. MUELLER, sUra note 1, § 140, at 120. In a related context, the court in Drew v. United
States, 331 F.2d 85,88 (D.C. Cir. 1964), described three ways in which prejudice may operate
where similar offenses by the same alleged defendant are joined for prosecution:
(1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2)
the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal dispo-
sition on the part of the defendant from which is found his guilt of the other crime
or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes
charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find.
331 F.2d at 88.
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may sever
counts of an indictment or information for separate trials if it appears that the defendant
would be prejudiced by the joinder of charges under Rule 8.
The interests to be balanced in deciding questions of joinder and severance are those of
avoiding redundant, time-consuming trials in which the same factual and legal issues must be
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other crimes are less offensive and/or less similar to the charged of-
fense, the risk of unfair prejudice decreases to middle or lower levels.
The suggested scaling of prejudice into high, middle, and low
degrees of risk provides courts with an analytical framework to assess
the standard of certainty which proof of other crimes must meet in
order to warrant admissibility. Higher certainty, as noted earlier, in-
creases the probative value of the other crimes evidence. Since proba-
tive value must be balanced against prejudicial dangers for the
evidence to be admitted, the appropriate standard of certainty must
vary with the risk of unfair prejudice generated by the evidence.
Higher prejudice demands higher certainty for admissibility,
and lower prejudice permits admission with lower certainty. The
standard of certainty must itself be viewed as a sliding scale. [See
Figure 1.] When the proof of other crimes is sufficiently certain to
raise the probative value of the evidence above the threshold of im-
permissible prejudice, it has reached the level of certainty required
by Rule 403.
The standard of proof thus depends upon the amount of
prejudice the evidence engenders. Once this relationship between
the balancing test of Rule 403 and the required certainty of other
crimes proof is perceived, it is clear that any single inflexible stan-
dard, such as "preponderance of the evidence," "clear and convinc-
ing evidence," or "beyond a reasonable doubt," is too wooden. That
is, a court can properly tolerate less certainty that the defendant
committed the other crime if the risk of prejudice is at the low end of
the scale. Conversely, it must demand greater certainty when the
danger of unfair prejudice is high.
litigated, and avoiding prejudice. The state's interest thus differs in this context from its
interest in the other crimes admissibility setting, where it wishes to place before the jury all
relevant evidence of guilt. Nonetheless, courts sometimes analyze the need for severance of
similar offenses by deciding their admissibility as other crimes evidence in separate trials and
find their being admissible under Rule 404(b) conclusive grounds for the denial of severance.
See United States v. Mullen, 550 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1977) (Engel, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Conversely, this analysis suggests that similar offenses severed because of
failure to pass muster under a Rule 404(b)-403 analysis should not be admissible as other
crimes evidence at the separate trial of either offense. The proponent should be denied back-
door passage where the front has been foreclosed.
Highly similar other crimes evidence may also increase the probative value of the evi-
dence, as in modus operandi cases and some cases where the other crimes evidence is offered
to prove intent. The simultaneous increase in probative value and prejudice complicates the
balancing analysis. See notes 139-48 infra and accompanying text.
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Figure 1. The Sliding Scale of Probative Value Required for
Evidence of Other Crimes.
A C X
This graph illustrates the sliding scale of proof to be applied to other crimes evidence.
The Y axis shows the degree of prejudice the evidence is likely to raise. The X axis represents
the degree of certainty that the defendant committed the other crime. The upward sloping
line moving from the origin shows the amount of evidentiary probative value required to
offset varying degrees of prejudice. Lines A-B and C-D show the increasing degree of cer-
tainty (a more stringent standard of proof) required as other crimes evidence moves from the
middle to high range of prejudice.
B. Preliminay Rulings on Admissibility
Under Rule 403, the judge must balance probative value against
prejudicial effect.49 Some of the confusion concerning admissibility
of other crimes evidence is attributable to uncertainty about whether
the decision to admit such evidence is a matter of preliminary fact-
finding for the judge (as it is with technical exclusionary rules), or an
issue of conditional relevancy, which requires only prima facie evi-
49 FED. R. EvID. 403; see also Dolan, supra note 7, at 225. In most instances this article




dence (or evidence sufficient to permit a jury finding).50
In a classic law review article,5' Edmund M. Morgan delineated
the roles of the judge and jury in preliminary fact finding.52 He sug-
gested that the jury system operates more effectively when judges de-
cide preliminary facts upon which the technical rules of exclusion are
conditioned. 53 Such rules, including those concerning privileges,
competency of witnesses, hearsay, and original documents, may re-
sult in the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of reliability or
some other policy. These rules are thought of as screening devices
designed to guard against specific problems.5 4 In these cases, the
judge usually must determine preliminary facts by a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard of proof.
55
While the technical exclusionary rules may for policy reasons
keep out even relevant evidence, conditionally relevant evidence is
relevant only if the condition is proved to exist.56 Preliminary ques-
tions of conditional relevancy are to be decided by the jury if the
proponent produces "sufficient" evidence for the jury to make a find-
ing.57 For example, in a murder case where the prosecutor offers evi-
dence that the defendant was the beneficiary of a large life insurance
policy on the victim, such evidence is relevant only on the condition
that the prosecutor can show the defendant knew that he had been
50 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b); see also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913
(5th Cir. 1978); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5054, at 268-69; Laughlin,
Preliminag Questions ofFaci: A New Theoy, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286 (1974).
51 Morgan, Functions ofJudge andJug in the Determination of Preliminag Questions of Fact, 43
HARv. L. REv. 165 (1929).
52 Id. at 165-66. Several other scholars have discussed the distinction between the roles of
the judge and the jury in preliminary factfinding as a function of whether the preliminary
question is one of competency or relevancy. See Laughlin, supra note 50, at 287; Maguire &
Epstein, teliminag Questions of Fact as Determining the Admisibtility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L.
REV. 292 (1927).
53 Morgan, supra note 51, at 166-69.
54 S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, sura note 2, at 28; Morgan, supra note 51, at 169.
55 Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminagy Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271
(1975); see also 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 35, at 260-62, 265-67; 22 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, §§ 5053, 5054, at 253-73.
56 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,Sufpra note 1, at 1058-60; 22
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5054, at 265-73.
57 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 31, at 219. The "sufficiency" standard
is also referred to as prima facie evidence. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 53, at 125 n. 1;
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, sura note 2, § 5054, at 268-69. But see Ball, The Mth of
ConditionalRelevanqy, 14 GA. L. REv. 435 (1980) (challenging conventional thinking regarding
the independent relevancy of conditional and conditioned facts to an ultimate issue). Profes-
sor Ball's analysis does not suggest a different effect (from that suggested by this article or
conventional judicial and scholarly thinking) of truth on the probative value of other crimes
evidence. See also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 1058-59 & n.3, 1060.
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named beneficiary. Once the prosecutor produces enough evidence
of defendant's knowledge of the policy to support a jury finding, the
judge admits the evidence, leaving the final determination of defend-
ant's knowledge to the jury. The rationale for permitting the jury to
decide questions of conditional relevancy is that the jury will readily
understand the connection between the preliminary fact and the rel-
evancy of the evidence, and that such a preliminary determination
will not encumber its role as ultimate factfinder. 58 The judge's role
in ruling on the admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence is
thus limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists to sup-
port a jury finding.59 This "sufficiency" standard requires the judge
to decide only whether a jury could reasonably find the existence of
the preliminary fact from the supporting evidence.
60
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Beechum 61 correctly pointed
out that the Federal Rules of Evidence have codified the functions of
judge and jury as outlined by Professor Morgan. 62 Rule 104(b), "rel-
evancy conditioned on fact," provides:
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition.
It follows then, as the court observed, that the issue of whether a
58 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 53, at 125; see also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 1, at 1058 (citing C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 53, at 125); 1 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 1, § 26, at 158; 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5054, at
266-67; cf. Laughlin, supra note 50, at 300-04.
Another rationale for the conditional relevancy exception to a judge's authority to make
preliminary determinations is the fear that his ruling would deprive the parties of a jury trial
where the preliminary and ultimate facts coincide. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 2, § 5054, at 266; see also I D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 33, at 236-37.
59 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 53, at 125.
60 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir. 1978). The "sufficiency" re-
quirement has also been described as one of prima facie evidence. Also note that the judge
can effectively direct a verdict on a preliminary issue under Rule 104(b) where "no reason-
able jury could disbelieve the preliminary fact, and the opponent offers no evidence contrary
to the preliminary fact." Under these circumstances the judge simply refuses to instruct the
jury to disregard the evidence if it is not convinced of its relevance. 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5054, at 269.
61 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
62 Id. at 913; see Morgan, supra note 51; see also FED. R. EvID. 104 advisory committee
note. Rule 104(a) provides:
(a) Questions of admissibilitygenerally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
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defendant committed another crime is one of conditional relevancy
to be decided under Rule 104(b). 63 The relevancy of the other crimes
evidence can be established only if the defendant can be shown to
have committed the act. If it never took place, or was committed by
someone else, it is not relevant to the charge for which the defendant
is being tried. This is precisely the kind of conditional relevancy
question which traditionally falls within the jury's competence.
64
In ruling on the admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence
under Rule 104(b), a judge must often perform a task in addition to
assessing whether there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
the condition exists that makes the evidence relevant. He may have
to balance the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial im-
pact. Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence where
the danger of unfair prejudice, or any of the other enumerated con-
siderations, substantially outweighs its probative value.65 The power
of exclusion under Rule 403 rests with the trial judge.66 Since the
degree of certainty that the defendant committed the other crime
determines in part its probative value as evidence, the judge must
consider the level of proof in balancing under the rule.
6 7
Of course, in many cases involving questions of conditional rele-
vancy, the judge need not perform this balancing test because the
evidence is not unfairly prejudicial, i.e., there is no danger that ajury
would use it improperly.68 For example, a prosecutor in an armed
robbery trial may try to establish the defendant's identity by intro-
ducing evidence that just before the robbery the defendant's uncle
loaned him his car with the uncle's pistol in the glove compartment.
Since the defendant is on trial for armed robbery, admitting evidence
of how he secured a weapon such as the one used in the crime, al-
though damaging to him, is not unfairly prejudicial.69 The effect of
this evidence is solely attributable to its probative force and not to
63 582 F.2d at 913. Compare Professor Laughlin's view that the defendant's commission
of the other crime should be established to the satisfaction of the judge before it is admitted.
Laughlin, supra note 50, at 308-09; see Kuhns, supra note 1, at 809 (arguing for a more strin-
gent check against admissibility).
64 See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
65 See note 15 supra.
66 See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
67 See 2 D. LouiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 1, § 140, at 118; C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 190, at 453; 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[10], at 404-55 to 404-
62; 22 C. WRIGHT.& K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5052, at 548; see also notes 38-44 supra and
accompanying text (discussing probative value).
68 See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5054, at 271.
69 See Dolan,supra note 7, at 238; see aso text accompanying notes 46-48supra (discussing
the various types of prejudice); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 156-67.
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any tendency to improperly influence the jury. There would be no
need to balance under Rule 403, since the jury would have no
trouble evaluating the appropriate weight to give the evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence were that the defendant stole
the car containing the gun from his uncle, the jury might have less
regret than normally expected at mistakenly convicting the defend-
ant, "a thief," for the charged armed robbery.70 Thus even if "suffi-
cient" evidence existed under Rule 104(b) to support a jury finding
that the defendant stole his uncle's car, the judge would still have to
balance its probative value against its prejudicial impact under Rule
403.71 It is at this point in the analysis that the certainty of proof will
determine admissibility. If the degree of certainty is not great
enough to produce a magnitude of probative value that prevents
substantially weightier prejudice, the judge should exclude the evi-
dence under Rule 403.72
C. Determining Unfair Prejudice and Probative Value-United States v.
Beechum
In United States v. Beechum ,73 one of the leading cases on the ad-
missibility of other crimes evidence, the Fifth Circuit showed how
balancing under Rule 403 might be done. Beechum had been con-
victed of unlawfully possessing an 1890 silver dollar that he knew to
have been stolen from the mails. On review the Fifth Circuit, rehear-
ing en banc a panel decision reversing the trial court's conviction,
held that the trial court had properly admitted evidence that at the
time of his arrest Beechum also possessed two credit cards that appar-
ently had been stolen from the mails approximately ten months ear-
lier.74 The court reasoned that the evidence was relevant to the issue
of his intent in possessing the silver dollar, since his unlawful intent
70 See note 47 supra.
71 This observation also argues for not admitting other crimes evidence subject to "con-
necting up" under Rule 104(b). The jury is less likely to be able to disregard the evidence
when connecting evidence is not forthcoming. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note
2, § 5054, at 271.
72 Rule 403 provides for balancing of all unfairly prejudicial evidence, not just other
crimes evidence. Such balancing will practically always be required when other crimes evi-
dence is offered because of its inherently prejudicial nature. See R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, sura note 1, at 220.
73 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
74 Id. at 916. Relevance had been shown in the Beechum case because:
The extrinsic offense is relevant [connected] (assuming the jury finds the defendant
to have committed it) to an issue other than propensity because it lessens the likeli-
hood that the defendant committed the charged offense with innocent intent.
Weinstein and Berger point out that "[e]vidence is relevant once it appears 'to alter the
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in possessing the credit cards made it more likely that he possessed
the silver dollar with the same intent. The court found that suffi-
cient evidence existed to support a jury finding that the defendant
intended permanently to deprive the owners of their credit cards and
that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 75 In analyzing the danger
of prejudice, the court said:
The extrinsic offense here is not of a heinous nature; it would
hardly incite the jury to irrational decision by its force on human
emotion. The credit card evidence was no more likely to confuse
the issues, mislead the jury, cause undue delay, or waste time
than any other type of extrinsic offense evidence.
76
In reversing the panel's finding that the government had not estab-
lished by "plain, clear, and convincing" evidence that the cards were
stolen from the mail, the court found that "there was sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to find that Beechum possessed property belonging
to the others, with the specific intent to deprive the owners of their
rightful possession permanently.
' 77
The court analyzed the inferences that may be drawn from gov-
ernment's proof as follows:
Beechum possessed the credit cards of two different individuals.
Neither card has been signed by the person to whom it was is-
sued. When asked about the cards, Beechum answered first that
the only cards he had were his own. When confronted with the
.credit cards, which were obviously not his own, Beechum re-
sponded that they had never been used. He refused to respond
further because the inspector "had all the answers." The logical
inference from this statement is that Beechum was attempting to
mitigate his culpability, having been caught red-handed. The
undisputed evidence indicated that he could have possessed the
cards for some ten months. The jury would have been wholly
justified in finding that Beechum possessed these cards with the
intent permanently to deprive the owners of them.
78
The.Beechum court thus determined (1) that the other crimes evi-
dence did not entail an inherently high risk of unfair prejudice and
(2) that the government's proof of facts supporting the inference of
intent was sufficiently certain to justify a finding that the probative
probabilities of a consequential fact.'" I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, .sufra note 2,
401[06], at 401-18.
75 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 917-18 (5th Cir. 1978).
76 Id. at 917.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 916.
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value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its danger
of prejudice.
9
Beechum thus makes clear that proof of the defendant's actually
having committed another crime is a question of conditional rele-
vancy. Accordingly, the judge does not decide the issue. Equally
clear, however, is the judge's obligation under Rule 403 to balance
probative value against unfair prejudice.80 The relationship between
79 Beechum overruled United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973). In Broad-
way, the defendant had been indicted for "transporting and causing to be transported in
interstate commerce a falsely made and forged security." Id. at 992. The court of appeals
held that a trial judge improperly admitted evidence of two other money orders stolen from
the same batch as the one on which the indictment was based. Both of the orders had been
made payable to the defendant, negotiated in temporal proximity to the one giving rise to the
indictment, and similarly endorsed. The court held that the government's proof fell short of
establishing that the defendant had placed the other money orders in interstate commerce.
Id. at 995. Because of this missing element of proof--that the defendant actually placed the
extra-indictment money orders into interstate commerce by negotiating them-the other of-
fenses, if offenses at all, were neither the same as nor similar to the offense for which the
defendant was standing trial. Id. at 995. Because the other offenses differed as to the "essen-
tial physical elements of the offense charged," the evidence lacked sufficient probative value
to outweigh the prejudice inherent in other crimes evidence and thus was not properly admis-
sible. Id. at 994-95. The Fifth Circuit repudiated the Broadway standard that the other crime
be proved by "plain, clear, and convincing" evidence because it imposed too strict a standard
of proof on the government under the conditional relevancy standard of Rule 104(b).
Beechum, 582 F.2d at 912-13. In the court's view, the Broadway approach erroneously required
that the evidence possess "great probative value" without regard to the balancing mandate of
Rule 403. Id. at 913.
As recognized by the Beechum court, the "plain, clear, and convincing" standard seeks to
assure that the probative value of the other crimes evidence is sufficiently high to offset its
inherent prejudice. This article criticized that standard as too wooden in light of the protean
character of the prejudice that must be balanced against probative value under Rule 403.
"Great probative value" will not be necessary to survive the Rule 403 balance when the other
crimes evidence carries a low risk of unfair prejudice. The immutable "plain, clear, and con-
vincing" standard in Broadway is a way, albeit erroneous, of striking the balance between
probative value and prejudice to decide the admissibility of conditionally relevant other
crimes evidence.
The standard of proof for evidence presenting a question of conditional relevancy should
not be confused with a standard of proof applied to preliminary factfinding. Regardless of
the standard used by the court in preliminary factfinding, the judge's task is to decide the
preliminary fact and not, at least at this stage, to balance under Rule 403. For example,
when a proponent of a document seeks to introduce secondary evidence of the document over
the opponent's best evidence objection, before the secondary evidence will be admitted, the
judge must decide by a "preponderance of the evidence" whether the original was lost or
destroyed. On the other hand, the question of whether the document ever existed is one of
conditional relevancy that the jury must decide. The judge's ruling is limited to determining:
(1) whether sufficient evidence exists to support ajury finding that the document existed and
(2) whether any danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence. In
striking this balance, the judge must consider, among other factors, the proof that the docu-
ment existed.
80 The Fifth Circuit's balancing analysis in Beechum considered the aspect of probative
value that depends upon the need for the evidence, its persuasiveness, and the proximity of
[19841
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE
prejudice and probative value under this balancing rule is illustrated










Assuming equal values on the X and Y axes, this graph depicts the two aspects of evidence-
probative value and unfair prejudice (including the other policy counterweights set forth in
Rule 403). The most troublesome evidentiary problems for judges arise in the shaded por-
tion, triangle A,B,C. In this area the prejudice of other crimes evidence does not clearly
"substantially outweigh" probative value, as it does in the striped area, trapezoid A,B,D,E.
As the quantitative relationship between prejudice and probative value approaches equality
at C, admissibility becomes more clearly warranted under Rule 403. Evidence possessing
probative value beyond C is clearly admissible, since any problems of prejudice are out-
weighed. Analytically, in the context of other crimes evidence, increased certainty that the
other crimes occurred produces movement upward along the probative value curve, making
admission under Rule 403 more likely.
the other crimes to the charged offense. 582 F.2d at 917. It also considered the impact of
other crimes proof on probative value. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text for the
discussion of the impact of proof on probative value. These excerpts from the court's opinion
indicate that the proof of stolen credit cards was more than "sufficient to support a jury
finding" and in fact supplied enough probative value to tip the balance in favor of admissibil-
ity. Furthermore, the court implicitly recognized the relationship between proof and proba-
tive value in its balancing analysis:
The probity of the credit card evidence in this case is augmented by the lack of
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in Figure 2. At this second step of the balancing analysis, the proof
that the defendant committed the other crime becomes crucial. For
only if the proof rises to the requisite level of certainty may it be
deemed probative enough to tip the balance in favor of admissibility.
This is true even though the proof might have met the sufficiency
standard under Rule 104(b). Conversely, if the evidence does not
establish to the appropriate degree of certainty that the defendant
committed the other crime, the danger of unfair prejudice will sub-
stantially outweigh it, and the evidence should be excluded under
Rule 403.81
D. Unfair Prejudice and Proof Problems in Recent Court Decisions
Recent federal cases citing Rule 404(b) reveal that risk of
prejudice is a major factor in determining how high a degree of cer-
tainty will be required. Evidence of other crimes involving a high
risk of unfair prejudice because of its similarity to the charged of-
fense, reprehensibility, or a combination of the two, entails a stricter
scrutiny of probative value than does evidence of other crimes with a
low risk of prejudice.
The evidence of other crimes admitted by the trial court in
United States v. Leonard82 involved a low risk of prejudice because it
bore little similarity to the charged offense and was not reprehensi-
ble. The defendant was charged with intentionally underestimating
adjusted gross income on his 1967 and 1968 income tax returns. To
temporal remoteness. Although Beechum may have obtained the cards as much as
ten months prior to his arrest for the possession of the silver dollar, he kept the cards
in his wallet where they would constantly remind him of the wrongfulness of their
possession.
582 F.2d at 917. The court thus regarded the length of time that Beechum had kept the cards
as proof of his guilty intent.
81 One might argue that less certainty of truth reduces probative value and the danger of
unfair prejudice together, so that the sliding scale should not assume that prejudice is at a
maximum magnitude while probative value varies with the proof. Rather, when, assuming
the maximum probative value as well as prejudice, when there is "sufficiency" and when
prejudice does not substantially outweigh probative value, the evidence should be admitted.
This argument ignores the inference of bad character that immediately attaches when
one is accused of wrongdoing. There is evidence that such inferences linger even after a
defendant has been officially exonerated of any wrongdoing. See, e.g., Hunt, John Connally
Stirs Up Many Strong Emotions Among Friend and Foe . . . Wheeler-Dealer Image Hurts, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 1; see also 223 NATION, Sept. 4, 1976, at 164-65 (suggesting Connally's
guilt even after he was acquitted). This writer perceives prejudice to be a relatively stable
phenomenon, while probative value varies with factors such as proof of the other crime. Cf.
notes 136-45 infra and accompanying text.
82 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975).
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prove intent, the government presented evidence of an allegedly false
1969 affidavit in which the defendant denied having any foreign
bank accounts or dealings with a foreign bank and a 1971 admission
that he possessed a Swiss bank account. The judge admitted the evi-
dence along with testimony of a Chase Manhattan Bank ("CMB")
official that in 1968 his bank delivered to the defendant six official
CMB checks totaling $383,000 issued pursuant to instructions from a
Swiss bank.
8 3
The defendant raised two arguments relating to the sufficiency
of the other crimes evidence. First, he argued that the bank man-
ager's testimony regarding the transfer of funds, combined with the
1971 admission regarding a personal Swiss bank account, did not
show that he personally had a Swiss bank account in 1969. He ar-
gued that the account from which the funds were transferred might
have belonged to a corporation owned by him or even to an outsider
and, therefore, that the evidence did not warrant admission because
it did not show with sufficient certainty that the 1969 statement con-
cerning his personal bank account was false. The Second Circuit
agreed with this contention. 84
Second, Leonard argued that the same evidence was insufficient
to show the falsity of the 1969 statement denying "any transactions
or dealings of any nature with any foreign banks or other representa-
tives." He argued that the transactions testified to by the CMB man-
ager were between CMB and him and were not dealings with a
foreign bank. The court rejected this argument as "formal to an ex-
treme" and held that it was more reasonable to conclude that CMB
had simply been a conduit for the transmission of funds from the
Swiss bank. The court deemed the evidence sufficient to prove that
Leonard knowingly received money from a foreign bank based on
the following considerations: the transfer of the funds from a Swiss
numbered account made direct evidence of the account owner im-
possible; because of the amount of money involved, it was highly
likely that Leonard knew its origin; he had no account at CMB; the
method chosen to deliver the official CMB checks to him was unu-
sual; and he took considerable steps to keep the checks out of his First
National City Bank account. 85
Regarding the prejudice associated with the evidence in Leonard,
the court reasoned:
83 Id at 1086.
84 Id. at 1090.
85 Id.
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It is true that transacting business with Swiss banks, or lying
about not having done so, is rather more likely to "arouse the
irrational passions of the jury" than was evidence of the claiming
of an improper deduction in an income tax return in UnitedStates
v. Kaufman [453 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1971)] ...
At the same time, we think that the defendant has over-
stated the case in claiming that this line of proof was "highly
inflammatory." The evidence was hardly the equivalent of a
bloody shirt, compare State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 379, 218
P.2d 300, 306 (1950), a dying accusation of poisoning, Shepard v.
UnitedStates, 290 U.S. 96. . .(1933),. . . or a claim of homosex-
uality . . . . Moreover, defendant's counsel at trial must not
have considered it to be that damaging, for he was willing to
bring out additional allegations of foreign bank connections if
they could be used for his own purposes.
8 6
The Second Circuit's decision in Leonard thus demonstrates the oper-
ation of Rule 104(b)'s "sufficiency" requirement, as well as the role of
prejudice in setting the required standard of proof. Since the testi-
mony of the CMB manager and defendant's 1971 admission were
insufficient to permit a jury to find that Leonard owned a Swiss ac-
count on or before the date he executed the affidavit denying it, the
evidence of the affidavit's falsity was held excludable. Of course, evi-
dence of other crimes with a low risk of prejudice, such as this, will
not be admitted if it does not rise to the threshold level of "suffi-
ciency" mandated by Rule 104(b). 87 Evidence not meeting that
standard of sufficiency can have only de minimis or no probative
value at all.
On the issue of whether the 1969 affidavit falsely asserted that
the defendant had had no dealings with a foreign bank, the CMB
manager's testimony should be sufficient to support an inference that
Leonard knew he was dealing with a foreign bank. However, the
apparent absence of any statements made by Leonard during the six
or more meetings between the manager and him indicating that he
knew the origin of the checks raises questions about the strength of
the inference. Similarly, the indeterminant number of possible ori-
gins of the funds increases the likelihood that Leonard did not know
the foreign bank origins of the funds. The court's willingness to
lower the requisite certainty of proof in this instance is tied to its
finding that no high risk of prejudice resulted from admitting the
86 Id. at 1091-92.
87 See United States v. Roglieri, 700 F.2d 883, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (distinguishing




The other crimes evidence approved by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Bimry 89 provides an excellent example of middle risk
prejudice. 9° The defendant, a former bank teller, was charged with
making false entries on her teller proof sheets on three separate occa-
sions in violation of a federal statute.91 In furtherance of the prose-
cutor's theory that she had made them to cover up an uncharged
embezzlement, the trial court admitted evidence that she had embez-
zled money from the bank. The proof consisted of two bank audits of
her cash drawer, one of which showed "a substantial shortage
($39,000), thus pointing to the possibility of embezzlement.
'92
While the extrinsic crime of embezzlement in Birn involved a
substantial sum of money, it was a non-violent crime not very high
on the scale of reprehensibility. Furthermore, it was sufficiently dis-
similar to the charged offense to avoid the problems of misestimation
and confusion that arise when the uncharged offense is very similar
to the charged one.93 While the documentary proof of embezzlement
88 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
89 686 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982).
90 In the middle risk range of prejudice, the uncharged offense is entirely dissimilar, or
generally similar but specifically dissimilar, to the charged offense, and is neither inoffensive
nor highly reprehensible. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 587 (3d
Cir. 1982) (where in a prosecution for first degree assault, robbery, and rape, the prosecutor
introduced evidence that the defendant carried a black gun under the seat of his car. Posses-
sion of the gun in this case might have been deemed low risk evidence but for the role of a gun
used by the offenders perpetrating this heinous crime.); see also United States v. Mastrototaro,
455 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1972)(where in a prosecution for aiding and abetting in the interstate
transportation of three stolen United States treasury bills, the court upheld the introduction
of evidence that the defendant had arranged gambling junkets to London and Haiti and
controlled a gambling and loan sharking organization); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d
526 (5th Cir. 1983) (This case involved a prosecution for conspiracy to possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court held that the trial judge did not err in
admitting into evidence testimony that the defendant nine years earlier had negotiated a
large sale of marijuana to a government agent. This evidence lies in the middle of the repre-
hensibility scale since it involves marijuana rather than a more destructive drug and is gener-
ally similar to the charged offense but specifically dissimilar.); United States v. Tisdale, 647
F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1981)(involving a prosecution for the interstate transportation of stolen
property and sale of a stolen antique tea set; evidence introduced that defendant offered to
sell a government informer 500 pounds of marijuana).
91 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1976).
92 686 F.2d at 106. Another judge had dismissed a charge of embezzlement against the
defendant after a four-day hearing when he concluded that she "had suffered substantial
prejudice with respect to her ability to defend herself against the embezzlement charge be-
cause of negligence on the part of the Government in failing to retrieve and safeguard docu-
mentary evidence bearing on the issue of her guilt or innocence." Id. at 104. Three years
intervened between the grand jury's subpoenaing the bank records that revealed the shortage
and her indictment for embezzlement.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 212-14 (5th Cir. 1983). The court
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was apparently not overwhelming in Bimq, evidence of the shortage
was found "sufficient" to support a finding of embezzlement.
94
When considered with the evidence of the false entries, it becomes
even more persuasive.95 The moderate level of certainty appearing
in the other crimes evidence in Birney is justified by the intermediate
risk of prejudice that it produced.
Nonetheless, the standard of proof in Bimey falls short of the
higher certainty that is required in high risk cases. In United States v.
Moris,96 the defendant was convicted of transporting minors and an
adult across state lines for purposes of prostitution. The prosecution
introduced evidence from one witness that the defendant had broken
into her house several times, abducted her, and beaten her. On at
least one occasion the beating was for the witness' failure to turn over
her earnings to him. The witness' story was corroborated by her
mother and hospital records. The trial judge admitted the evidence
to show both the nature of defendant's relationship with the witness
and his ability to transport her in interstate commerce.
The other crimes evidence in Morris was highly reprehensible,
invoking fears about violence and the security of home and person.
With the added offensiveness of human exploitation inherent in the
pimp-prostitute relationship, the resulting high risk of prejudice re-
quired a high standard of proof that the defendant had in fact com-
mitted the break-ins and beatings. That high standard was satisfied
by the documentary and testimonial corroboration of the apparently
credible evidence given by defendant's victim. This high standard
would not have been met, however, if her testimony had been either
held that evidence of a county supervisor's statements to a prospective seller of private land to
the county that the sale could be made only if the seller gave him a specified three-acre tract
of the land, followed by the county's purchase of the land, was admissible on the issue of
intent. The defendant was being tried for conditioning a prospective contractor's well-drill-
ing contract on his willingness to drill a free well for the defendant. Though the offenses were
not identical, they were of the same "genre," and so created not only a stronger inference on
the issue of intent but also a greater potential for jury misuse of the evidence.
94 The Second Circuit in Birn, 686 F.2d at 106-07, did not analyze the evidence's pro-
bative value. It merely found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's instruction directing
the jury to consider the embezzlement evidence on the issue of motive only.
95 In this sense the case looks very much like a plan or scheme case, where the probative
value of the evidence increases because of its logical fit with other parts of the scheme. See
notes 129-35 infra and accompanying text.
96 700 F.2d 427 (lst Cir. 1983). For other examples of evidence which risks a high degree
of prejudice because of its reprehensibility, see United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704 (9th
Cir. 1982)(kidnapping case; evidence introduced that defendant gave drugs to and had sexual
relations with a nine-year-old boy); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.
1975) (wire and mail fraud of an insurance company; evidence introduced that defendant had
murdered his partner in an earlier scheme).
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uncorroborated or vague and unspecific about either the break-ins
and beatings or about her assailant's identity.
97
The problem of high prejudice resulting from great similarity
between the charged and uncharged offenses is often encountered
where other crimes evidence is offered on the issue of intent.98 Be-
cause the persuasiveness of other crimes evidence in p'oving intent
rests upon the strength of the inference that the same intent fueled
both the uncharged and charged offenses, it is best shown by estab-
lishing the similarity between the crimes.99 Simultaneously, there is
great potential for a jury to misuse evidence of other, highly similar
crimes by inferring the defendant's criminal disposition from it or by
97 See United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 1983)(Vagueness of the
other crimes evidence "made its reliability questionable and diminished its probative
value.').
In the prosecution of a defendant for the receipt of stolen property, a specific intent
crime, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Melia, 691 F.2d 672, 676-77 (4th Cir. 1982),
assumed that the evidence of defendant's prior receipt of stolen property was relevant. The
court found, however, that the prosecution witness' vague descriptions of the prior incidents
gave the evidence questionable reliability and diminished its probative value. Id. at 677. The
witness had pleaded guilty to burglary. He testified that he and an associate, who had partic-
ipated in the burglary of a jewelry store from which the goods had been stolen and who later
disappeared, had been to the defendant's house several times and had once attempted to sell
stolen goods to the defendant. He testified that he had discussed other possible burglaries
with the defendant on that occasion but could provide no details about the dates of the visits,
the places visited, the names of persons contacted, or the jewelry stolen, "except that the sale
of jewelry involving Melia was to an 'older gentleman, tall . ..gray hair, very dignified
looking."' Id. at 675. Another government witness testified that he and the defendant sold
stolen goods to a doctor and met the next day in a hospital room to complete the transaction.
While admitting that the defendant was his barber and patient, the doctor denied receiving
stolen goods from him. The government produced no evidence of the existence of a hospital
nor of a room in a hospital matching the government witness' description. The high degree of
similarity between the other crimes evidence and the charged offense would require this arti-
cle's strictest standard to scrutinize the other crimes proof.
See also United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1983), in which the Eighth Cir-
cuit discussed the sufficiency of other crimes evidence admitted under its "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" standard. The evidence was held properly admitted, even though given by a
government informant and uncorroborated, where the testimony was unambiguous and spe-
cific. Id. at 249. The informant had testified "to when the transaction occurred, what sub-
stance was involved, how much of it was involved, and who participated in the transaction."
Id.
98 Highly similar other crimes evidence is usually at issue in cases where the prosecutor is
seeking to prove intent. But while both probative value and prejudice are deemed to increase
with similarity, not all intent evidence is highly similar. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell,
700 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1983) (in trial for unauthorized use, acquisition, and possession of
food stamps, evidence introduced of gambling and receiving stolen goods); United States v.
Tisdale, 647 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1981) (in trial for interstate transportation of stolen property
and sale of stolen goods, evidence introduced of intent to sell marijuana). For a discussion of
modus operandi evidence, see text accompanying notes 139-48 infra.
99 See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978).
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considering the evidence cumulatively.100
The other crimes evidence admitted by the trial court in United
States v. Jones,0 1 for example, involved a high risk of unfair prejudice
because of its similarity to the charged offense.10 2 The defendant was
being tried for intentionally distributing quaalude, a Schedule II
controlled substance, in violation of a federal statute that prohibited
its distribution without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the
course of professional practice. The prosecutor introduced evidence
of 478 other prescriptions issued by the defendant for Schedule II
drugs, plus testimony that several of the patients named on the pre-
scriptions were recognized drug addicts, to show the defendant's
knowledge and unlawful intent in prescribing the quaalude.
The Eighth Circuit on appeal held that the proof did not suffi-
ciently establish that any one of the 478 prescriptions had been is-
sued outside of the bounds of the professional relationship between
doctor and patient. While acknowledging that the testimony of the
police officers suggested illegal distribution to recognized drug ad-
dicts, the court was unwilling to admit the evidence without a higher
degree of certainty.10 3 Since the 478 other prescriptions offered in
Jones were for the same type of drug whose alleged unlawful distribu-
tion led to the defendant's prosecution, a jury was more likely to infer
that defendant was "a drug pusher" and base a finding of guilt on
this inference than to rest its conclusion on evidence relating to the
particular charged offense. Such an inference would be precisely the
100 See note 48 supra.
101 570 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978).
102 For other examples of other crimes evidence entailing a high risk of prejudice because
of their similarity to the charged offense, see United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340 (1 1th Cir.
1983) (prosecution for making false representations to secure a loan or property; evidence of
other such false applications); United States v. Parker, 699 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1983) (prosecu-
tion for impersonating a federal agent; evidence introduced of a telephone conversation in
which the defendant repeated his impersonation); United States v. Dixon, 698 F.2d 445
(I 1th Cir. 1983)(prosecution for wilfully understating tax liability for 1975 and 1976; evi-
dence introduced of such understatements for 1977); United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d 1277
(1 lth Cir. 1983)(conspiracy to possess, import, and distribute more than 1,000 pounds of ma-
rijuana, and distribution of one pound; evidence introduced of the importation and posses-
sion of marijuana on other occasions); United States v. Fischel, 693 F.2d 800 (8th Cir.
1982) (prosecution for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; evidence in-
troduced that the defendant distributed methamphetamine at a party two months after the
indictment); United States v. Melia, 691 F.2d 672 (1 1th Cir. 1982)(prosecution for receiving
stolen property; evidence introduced of the uncharged receipt of stolen property). The court's
acknowledgement suggests that the 104(b) "sufficiency" standard was satisfied in Jones.
103 570 F.2d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 1978). The court's acknowledgement suggests that the
104(b) "sufficiency" standard was satisfied inJones.
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one prohibited by Rule 404(b). 104 Apart from the issue of intent, the
jury was also more likely to confuse the issues by treating evidence of
the other prescriptions as support for a finding that the defendant
unlawfully prescribed drugs as charged. Even in the absence of such
confusion, the jury was likely to misestimate the value of evidence of
similar unlawful prescriptions in proving unlawful intent.10 5 The
court thus correctly decided that absent greater certainty that the
defendant had committed the extrinsic offenses, the probative value
of the evidence in./ones was substantially outweighed by the dangers
of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.
10 6
E. Special Cases
In prosections for child abuse, other crimes evidence is generally
relevant to show absence of mistake or accident. Because the victim
is generally unable to communicate effectively what happened, need
for this evidence can practically always be shown. That is, other
crimes evidence often has significant probative potential in child
abuse cases. On the other hand, because of the jury's presumed an-
gry reaction to parental abuse of defenseless children, the degree of
prejudice is unusually high. It is not surprising to find, therefore,
that in this class of cases courts are very careful in their analysis of
proof and require a high standard of certainty before admitting this
evidence.1
0 7
104 See note 6 supra.
105 See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 1, at 160-62.
106 570 F.2d at 769; see also United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in
which the other crimes evidence combines the features of reprehensibility and similarity. The
defendant had been charged with the knowing possession of heroin with intent to distribute.
He claimed that the heroin seized from his jacket at the time of his arrest had been placed
there by police officers. Id. at 955. The prosecutor attempted to show that the defendant had
possessed heroin sixteen days after his arrest for the charged offense by showing that he was in
an apartment where a large quantity of heroin was found. The court found that the proof of
the defendant's mere presence in the apartment, without linking the heroin found there to
him, produced only a weak inference of intent that was substantially outweighed by the in-
herent unfair prejudice of his subsequent arrest for possession of drugs. Id. at 1000-01.
James reveals again that other crimes evidence can overcome the "sufficiency" hurdle of
Rule 104(b) and still be insufficiently probative to offset the risk of unfair prejudice. The lack
of sufficient probative value resulted from an absence of adequate proof connecting the de-
fendant with the extrinsic crime.
107 In United States v. Brown, 608 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1979), for example, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the conviction of the defendant for recklessly and with criminal negligence causing
bodily injury to a child. The reversal was based on the improper admission of photographs
and testimony concerning multiple facial and bodily bruises and of earlier hospitalizations of
the child prior to the incident in question. Without discussing prejudice, the court held that
the proof failed to demonstrate either that an offense had been committed or that the defend-
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A category of cases where the theory suggested in this article,
tying the standard of proof to amount of unfair prejudice, may ap-
pear in practice to break down is the prosecution of illegal aliens. 08
Trial courts, affirmed by circuit courts, apply a lower standard in
admitting evidence of similar offenses, notwithstanding their ac-
knowledgment of the high risk of prejudice. 10 9 These decisions are
ant had committed it. This shortcoming rendered the evidence inadmissible under Beechum.
Id. at 554-55.
Intrinsically, the evidence in Brown was highly prejudicial because of its offensiveness
and close similarity to the crime charged in the indictment. Thus, while the photographs and
testimony supported an inference of criminal negligence, the probative value produced by
this showing was too weak to justify admission.
Conversely, in United States v. Colvin, 614 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1980), a case factually
similar to Brown, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of the defendant for the second-
degree murder of her infant daughter. The trial court admitted testimony revealing that the
defendant had admitted to two different persons that she had repeatedly struck her daugh-
ter's head against a tile floor approximately ten days before her death, and evidence that her
daughter had been hospitalized about two months before her death for treatment of rib,
clavical, and leg fractures. Distinguishing its decision in Brown, the court held that the gov-
ernment's proof in Colvin was sufficient for a jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant
was responsible for the injuries shown by the other crimes evidence. The proof consisted of
the defendant's admissions that she had had exclusive control over her daughter at the time of
her injuries and that she had inflicted injuries upon the child. The court concluded that the
"probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of any prejudicial effect." Id. at 45.
The defendant's voluntary admission of the other crimes, of course, meets the highest standard
of proof.
In United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138 (10th Cir. 1981), a child abuse case upholding a
conviction for second-degree murder, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Brown, holding that
"the evidence in the instant case, considered in its totality, permits the inference that it was
the defendant, and not someone else, who battered his son on the other occasions." Id. at 143.
The Harris court acknowledged the prejudicial nature of the "battered child" evidence but
cited language from the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974), stating that evidence of repeated incidents of
child abuse is especially relevant since it may be the only means to prove the crime. 661 F.2d
at 142. As to proof that the defendant caused the earlier injuries to his son, the court noted
the following items of evidence: (1) defendant's opportunity to injure his child based on the
increased time spent with the child after his mother returned to work; (2) the testimony of
babysitters tending to negate the possibility that someone else injured him; (3) his wife's de-
nial that she struck the child, although she attributed the injuries to an accident; and (4) his
admission to psychologists of a mental problem which possessed him with an urge to harm his
children. Medical testimony also established the probability that the injuries came from ex-
ternal blows rather than from an accident. The court concluded that while there was no
direct evidence that the defendant caused the earlier injuries, the circumstantial evidence
convincingly pointed to him. Id. at 140-42.
For a discussion of United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 979 (1974), see notes 126-29 infra and accompanying text.
108 See United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376, 379-81 (9th Cir. 1979) (and cases
cited therein).
109 The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Herrera-Medina is questionable re-
garding its finding of sufficient probative value to justify admissibility. In that case the de-
fendant was convicted for unlawfully transporting four illegal aliens. The other crimes
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aberrational and are possibly explained by the courts' sensitivity or
oversensitivity to the difficult social problems caused by illegal
immigration. 1 0
IV. The Sliding Scale of Proof-The Second Step in the
Balancing Process
A. Weighing the Evidence Assuming One Hundred Percent Certainty
Since other crimes evidence is admissible only for a relevant pur-
pose, the admissibility analysis should begin by identifying the issue
for which the other crimes evidence is being offered. In the hypothet-
ical murder trial discussed in Section II, if the defendant denies com-
mitting the murder, the prosecutor may seek to introduce evidence of
the First National Bank robbery to establish that the defendant had
a motive and is thus more likely to have committed the murder that
he denies.II' Initially, the judge must determine the prejudicial dan-
ger of the other crimes evidence considering such factors of prejudice
as similarity and reprehensibility. He should also consider external
factors, such as potential for confusing or misleading the jury, and
whether the defendant can effectively rebut evidence of other crimes
without unduly delaying the final resolution of the case. Applying
these principles to the hypothetical murder trial, the judge will find
that if it can be proved that the defendant robbed the bank in the
presence of the victim, who knew him, the evidence would be rele-
vant to his motive to commit murder.
The court might further find that the evidence is needed to es-
tablish motive."12 In analyzing the degree of unfair prejudice
evidence admitted at trial consisted of two prior arrests involving the transportation of illegal
aliens. 609 F.2d at 378. Because the evidence was offensive, given current public attitudes
toward illegal aliens, and contained high similarity to the conduct leading to indictment, it
possessed a high risk of prejudice. The government's other crimes proof was circumstantial
and in at least one case inconclusive. Id. at 378-79.
While acknowledging that the government's failure to prosecute weakened the probative
value of the evidence and that the risk of prejudice was high, the court nevertheless held the
evidence to be admissible. Id. at 380. The decision cited two other cases involving illegal
aliens where a lower standard of other crimes proof was applied by the court. Id.
110 Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of Just Immigration Law and Polio,, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 615, 637-38 (1981).
111 See text accompanying notes 19-32 supra.
112 It should be noted that "need" as a component of probative value is distinguishable
from "logical persuasiveness" and "certainty." The latter two are inherent qualities of the
evidence as it relates to one or more factual issues. Need, on the other hand, is a question
about the amount of evidence required on a particular factual issue. Under Rule 403, while
persuasiveness and certainty are to be balanced against dangers of prejudice, confusion, or
misleading the jury, need in the sense of incremental probative value must be balanced
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presented by this evidence, the judge should consider the reprehensi-
bility of the robbery and its similarity to the charged offense. While
it is not identical to murder, the robbery with its overtones of vio-
lence and intimidation would place quite high on the scale of repre-
hensibility. Such prejudice would call for a high countervailing
standard of proof on the sliding scale.
The judge should first assume that the prosecutor can establish
with complete certainty that the defendant committed the robbery
and balance this maximum potential probative value of the other
crimes evidence against its harm. t1 3 If its potential probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudice, the evidence should be ex-
cluded and the analysis concluded at this point.
B. Adjusting the Balance
If the potential probative value of the evidence is high enough to
survive this first step in the two-fold balancing test, the judge should
then consider the strength of the evidence actually supporting an in-
ference that the defendant committed the other crime. The potential
probative value of the other crimes evidence, based upon the previ-
ously assumed one hundred percent certainty that the defendant
committed the other crime, should then be reduced by the unavaila-
ble or missing proof supporting the other crimes evidence. The judge
should adjust the first balance to reflect this reduction to actual pro-
bative value and once again strike a balance to determine whether
the degree of prejudice (unchanged from the first balancing test) sub-
stantially outweighs the actual probative value of the evidence. If
the evidence is insufficient to support a jury finding that the defend-
ant committed the other crime, it can clearly be excluded under Rule
104(b). Even if the evidence would support a jury finding, but its
actual probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice, the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403. If the
evidence is sufficient under Rule 104(b) and its actual probative
value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice, the evidence
should be admitted under Rule 403.114
In the hypothetical murder case, the second step of the balanc-
against the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The need factor is thus appropri-
ately considered at this initial weighing of probative value against the Rule 403
counterweights.
113 See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir. 1978); FED. R. EvID. 403.
114 The potential for prejudice will change where the proof results in less similarity. See
Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913-14. What the prosecutor sought to establish as a similar crime may
be shown by the proof to be only an innocent act. See, e.g., note 106 supra.
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ing analysis must follow the first. In step one, the judge assumes both
that the prosecutor can prove with complete certainty that the mur-
der victim witnessed the defendant's bank robbery and that the evi-
dence is needed. He may conclude after this step that the prejudice
does not substantially outweigh the potential probative value of the
evidence. At step two, the judge would consider the prosecutor's ac-
tual quantum of proof that the victim saw the defendant commit the
robbery. If the prosecutor could not show that victim knew or had
any other connection with the defendant, the judge should exclude
the evidence as insufficient under Rule 104(b).
Suppose the prosecutor could prove only that the victim was in
the bank and knew the defendant at the time of the robbery, the
defendant was a look-out stationed outside the bank, the bank had
windows and glass doors, the victim was in a line of five customers
waiting to be served with her back to the window, and the defendant
glanced through the bank's window while acting as a look-out. Sup-
pose further that the prosecutor was not able to show that the victim
saw the defendant or that he saw her. This evidence would be suffi-
cient to support a jury finding that the defendant knew that the vic-
tim had seen him take part in the robbery. However, since both the
victim's presence as a witness to the defendant's crime and his knowl-
edge of her presence are crucial to the inference of his motive, with-
out a better showing of victim's and defendant's awareness of one
another, the certainty of the facts offered to support an inference of
motive would drop substantially. As a result, the potential probative
value of the other crimes evidence for establishing the defendant's
motive would be substantially reduced. In view of the high certainty
requirement mandated by the other crime's high risk of prejudice, its
actual probative value should be deemed insufficient to justify ad-
mission under Rule 403. The adjusted balance should be struck in
favor of exclusion. On the other hand, if the prosecutor could pro-
duce evidence that the defendant and the murder victim knew each
other and had exchanged glances during the robbery, the evidence's
actual probative value would rise and tilt the balance in favor of
admissibility.115
This two-step approach has four significant advantages. First, it
recognizes the distinction between "sufficiency" determinations for
questions of conditional relevancy and balancing to determine ad-
missibility under Rule 403. Second, it removes the misconception
that it is helpful in this situation to categorize standards of proof in
115 See notes 38-44 sufira and accompanying text.
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terms of "preponderance of the evidence," "clear and convincing evi-
dence," or "beyond a reasonable doubt."11 6 This static view is fun-
damentally inconsistent with the balancing approach required by
Rule 403.1 7 Third, it uncovers and gives an analytical structure to
what judges have often done intuitively." 8 Fourth, the balancing
analysis will assist Fifth Circuit trial courts, and those in other cir-
cuits that are likely to follow the Fifth Circuit's lead, who upon the
request of a party are required to make "on the record" findings
under Beechum. Such courts must articulate their analysis of whether
the probative value of other crimes evidence is substantially out-
weighed by prejudice. 19
C. Appobying the Sliding Scale to Other Crimes Evidence
The sliding scale analysis of other crimes proof would have pro-
duced a different result in United States v. Dolliole 120 The defendant
was convicted of participating in a Chicago bank robbery as the
driver of a getaway car. He had waited in the car in the bank's park-
ing lot while his passenger robbed the bank. After his passenger re-
turned, the defendant drove the car from the bank but was arrested
moments later. He claimed that he had no knowledge of his passen-
ger's participation in a robbery and that he had driven him to the
bank to cash a money order. Among the evidence introduced at trial
by the prosecutor was the passenger's statement that defendant was
his accomplice in an earlier robbery of the Hillside bank in suburban
Chicago. This testimony was uncorroborated, impeached by two
prior inconsistent statements, and denied by the defendant, who was
never charged in the Hillside bank robbery. The trial court admitted
the evidence. 121 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the trial court's ad-
mission of evidence of the Hillside robbery was proper, because it
was relevant to the issue of defendant's intentional participation in
the charged robbery, not unfairly prejudicial, and defendant's partic-
ipation in the Hillside robbery was "clear and convincing."
The first step of the balancing process, balancing under Rule
116 See notes 11-14 supra.
117 See notes 7, 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
118 See notes 82-107 supra and accompanying text.
119 See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 1983), requiring the trial
judge in Rule 404(b) cases to make an "on-the-record articulation ... of Beechum's probative
value/prejudice inquiry when requested by a party." Other circuits have incorporated
Beechum's two-step analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d 1277 (11th Cir.
1983).
120 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979).
121 Id. at 104-05.
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403 assuming one hundred percent certainty, was properly carried
out under this article's analysis. Evidence of defendant's participa-
tion in an earlier robbery where he drove a getaway car increases the
probability that he knowingly participated in the charged robbery.
In the absence of substantial evidence on the issue of intent, the pro-
bative value of the other robbery evidence is probably great enough
to justify admission despite high prejudice. But after this initial bal-
ancing the court's analysis goes awry. Contrary to the court's find-
ing, the Hillside robbery evidence carries a high risk of prejudice for
two reasons: it is both highly similar to the charged robbery and a
reprehensible crime. The risk of unfair prejudice is exacerbated by
defendant's not having been charged, tried, or convicted for his par-
ticipation in the Hillside robbery. This high risk of unfair prejudice
should have required the judge to raise the standard of proof to en-
sure sufficient probative value to offset any disproportionate unfair
prejudice. Instead, the trial court permitted impeached and uncor-
roborated testimony to establish the defendant's involvement in the
Hillside robbery.122 While admitting the possibility that testimony
could be so incredible as to not meet the clear and convincing stan-
dard, the Seventh Circuit held that if the witness was to be believed,
his testimony was sufficiently clear and convincing to be admitted. 1
23
The problem was precisely that the witness could not be believed
because he had made two written statements that were inconsistent
with his testimony. Furthermore, no one could corroborate the wit-
ness' in-court version of the facts. On this evidence, it remains highly
questionable whether the defendant committed the Hillside robbery.
The error in the court's ruling results from its failure to perceive fully
the risk of unfair prejudice. In doing so it permitted the admission of
highly prejudicial evidence with substantially lower probative value,
in contravention of Rule 403.124
122 Id. at 106-08.
123 • Id. at 107. While this article supports the Beechum holding, which rejects a static stan-
dard such as "clear and convincing" evidence as governing the proof required for other
crimes admissibility, the court's citation of the "clear and convincing" standard in Dolliol, id.
at 106, is not out of line, since a higher standard than mere "sufficiency" is dictated by the
amount of unfair prejudice generated by the evidence. While the court's adherence to such a
high standard of proof may have been in error where the other crimes evidence carries a low
risk of unfair prejudice, in this case this high standard is warranted. The problem in Dolliol
is that the court actually applies a lower standard of proof in admitting the Hillside robbery
evidence while articulating a much higher one.
124 See United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983), where the court permitted
other crimes evidence without any proof. This ruling is clearly erroneous, although probably
harmless error.
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1. Multiple and Interconnected Prior Crimes
The sliding scale analysis has a peculiar application to a species
of other crimes evidence characterized by high logical probative
value-cases of multiple prior acts. Most other crimes evidence
seems to involve a single act of misconduct. 125 There the problems of
proof are self-contained, and the judge can make a relatively simple
admissibility decision based on the circumstances surrounding the
single act. Where the evidence of other crimes involves a pattern of
multiple acts, the proof of each act could be considered separately in
judging its probative value, or the court could consider the proof of-
fered for the prior crimes in the aggregate in determining the proba-
tive value for each and all of them.
United States v. Woods 126 presents an example of the aggregative
approach. In that case the defendant, a professional foster mother,
was tried for murdering her eight-month-old foster son. Evidence
showed that the baby died while in a coma produced by cyanosis, a
condition caused by a lack of oxygen. To prove that the victim's
death was not a result of accident or natural causes, as the defendant
claimed, the prosecutor introduced evidence that she had had access
to or custody of nine children over a twenty-four year period who
had suffered numerous cyanotic episodes while in her care. Seven of
them died.127 It is obvious from the similarity and reprehensibile na-
125 See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Shav-
ers, 615 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Drury, 582 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Juarez, 561 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Schoole, 553
F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Leonard,
524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318
(7th Cir. 1974).
126 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
127 Id. at 129-32. One of the children, who was less than two years old, had six cyanotic
episodes over a 21-month period. No cyanotic difficulty was discovered during her hospitali-
zation, and when she was removed from defendant's custody, the episodes did not recur.
Another child, a one-month-old infant, had two episodes with the defendant. The child was
hospitalized, but no problems were found. The child died two days after being released from
the hospital. Although defendant claimed she was not present when the infant died, the
government offered evidence to the contrary. A third baby, one month and twenty-seven
days old, had spent the first three weeks of her life in a hospital and had thereafter suffered
four or five cyanotic episodes while alone with the defendant. Her death occurred while in
the arms of defendant, and the cause of death urged by the defendant was shown to have
been extremely unlikely. In the remaining cases the victims ranged from three months and
twenty-one days to three years, seven months. Each died from cyanotic episodes, except that
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ture of this other crimes evidence that the danger of unfair prejudice
to the defendant was substantial and required a high degree of offset-
ting probity to justify its admission. In using the aggregative ap-
proach to analyze the proof of defendant's guilt in the other deaths,
the court noted that she had won a motion for acquittal in the case of
one death because the government's proof was insufficient to support
a jury verdict. It also acknowledged that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish her guilt in any single instance. But viewing the
facts collectively, the court was persuaded that the defendant had
caused all nine victims' deaths. 128 With the evidence of each addi-
tional child victim, it became increasingly likely that the death of the
eight-month-old baby, for whose murder the defendant was being
tried, was caused by her rather than by accident or nature. Hence
the logical probative value of any individual incident increased with
evidence of each additional one. 129 The combined proof that nine
children were victims of cyanotic episodes while in the defendant's
custody raises the probative value of this other crimes evidence. The
court in Woods thus properly found that this evidence's high risk of
prejudice did not substantially outweigh its very high probative
value. 3
0
Similarly, if the other crimes evidence is relevant because it is
part of a single criminal transaction leading to the charged offense,
proof of its occurrence will not be limited to the independent evi-
dence of its occurrence. In those cases proof of any part of the trans-
the three-year-old who had diptheria at the time of his death died while in bed with the
defendant. The other children in the home who suffered from diptheria all survived. Id.
128 Id. The court noted that:
[W]ith regard to no single child was there any legally sufficient proof that defendant
had done any act which the law forbids. Only when all of the evidence concerning
the nine other children and [the child for whose murder she was acquitted] is con-
sidered collectively is the conclusion impelled that the probability that some or all of
the other deaths, cyanotic seizures, and respiratory deficiencies were accidental or
attributable to natural causes was so remote, the truth must be that [the victim] and
some or all of the other children died at the hands of the defendant.
Id.
In People v. Williams, No. 39631 (Ga. Dec. 5, 1983), where Wayne Williams was tried in
the highly publicized Atlanta case, the prosecutor was permitted to introduce evidence of ten
other child murders for which Williams was not on trial to show a "pattern or bent of mind,"
even though Williams was on trial for only two of them. Given the prejudicial nature of this
evidence, a discreet, case-by-case analysis would have indicated insufficient probative value.
Aggregated, the evidence of fibers, eyewitnesses, and blood type connecting Williams to the
other murders was presumably much more convincing.
129 See notes 37 and 44 supra and accompanying text.
130 484 F.2d at 135.
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action will tend to prove the entire occurrence.13' United States v.
Derring 3 2 provides an example. The defendant was tried for trans-
porting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce. 133 The prosecutor
introduced evidence that the defendant had killed the car's owner,
stolen the car, and thereafter tried to dispose of the car by selling it.
The theft and murder were relevant because they provided a reason
for the interstate transportation. Because these acts were inextricable
parts of the whole criminal transaction, proof of the theft and mur-
der was established in part by their logical fit into the transportation
scheme, and in part by the evidence of the car owner's disappearance
and a potential buyer's account of the defendant's admission of the
theft and murder. 3 4 Having been resolved this way, the problem of
proof was not even discussed by the appellate court in approving the
trial judge's admissibility decision.'
35
In cases of multiple offenses constituting a pattern and cases of
interconnected offenses forming an indivisibile criminal transaction,
131 See United States v. Derring, 592 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1979). The Derring court noted
that:
[Where the evidence is relevant and competent to prove and establish a material
fact for which the appellants are charged and the other offense is inextricably a part
of the guilty act itself, the court does not commit error in allowing testimony of the
other offense.
If several crimes are intermixed, or blended with one another, or connected so
that they form an indivisible criminal transaction, and full proof by testimony,
whether direct or circumstantial, of any one of them cannot be given without show-
ing the others, evidence of any or all of them is admissible against a defendant on
trial for an offense which is itself a detail of the whole criminal scheme.
Id. at 1007 (citing Ignacio v. Territory of Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 943 (1970)); see also United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974).
132 592 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1979).
133 Id. at 1004.
134 Id. at 1007. The court stated that "the theft, murder, interstate transportation and
attempts to dispose of the automobile were part of a single transaction over a four-day period.
Each of these acts was inextricably bound up with the others, and proof of the offense charged
necessarily involved evidence of the other criminal conduct." Id.
135 See a/so United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979). The defendant and
others were tried for possession of heroin and conspiracy. The Fifth Circuit approved the
introduction of evidence of defendant's gift of cocaine to a government agency at the end of a
meeting during which the defendant admitted conspiring with the other defendants to dis-
tribute heroin. The court held that the evidence was admissible because it was a crucial part
of the meeting where the defendant made damaging admissions concerning his participation
in the charged conspiracy. Proof of the entire transaction turned on the government agent's
credibility. If his testimony is credible about one part of the transaction, it is extremely likely
to be credible about the entire transaction. Hence, the relationship between the admission
and the illegal gift as parts of a single transaction tends to prove that the gift was made. The
court pointed out that the agent's testimony would have been "confusing had he not been
able to explain how, eleven days after [two other defendants] had been arrested for heroin
[1984]
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE
the sliding scale of proof gives the judge the flexibility contemplated
by Rules 402, 403, and 404(b). The standard of certainty required
for each offense can easily be adjusted downward to recognize the
increased probative value created by the relationship between the
other acts and the charged offense. Yet the overall probative value of
the other crimes evidence remains unchanged.136 This adjustment
makes it easier to demonstrate sufficient probative value to offset the
policy counterweights of Rule 403.
2. Evidence with High Logical Probative Value
Evidence with high logical probative value carries more weight
against unfair prejudice than evidence with lower logical probative
value at the first step of the balancing process. 37 In adjusting the
balance in the second step, less proof is necessary to offset unfair
prejudice if its logical probative value is high than if it is lower. That
is, the stronger the logical inferences created by the evidence, the
greater its probative value.
For example, if a defendant is being tried for robbing a grocery
store with a .357 magnum pistol, evidence that he robbed a sporting
goods store two weeks before and took a .357 magnum produces a
strong inference that he committed the grocery store robbery. If the
prosecutor could establish the facts of the sporting goods store rob-
bery and that the defendant was seen on the block of the sporting
goods store shortly before and after the robbery, the probative value
of that crime on the issue of identity would be quite high. On the
other hand, if the prosecutor could establish only that the sporting
goods store was robbed and a pistol taken, but not its make and
model, the evidence would be less logically probative, and the proof
of defendant's proximity to the scene of the robbery less productive
of probative value. 38 Thus the same proof that generates high pro-
bative value where the logical inference is strong may be considera-
bly less productive where the logical inference created by the other
dealing, he and [the defendant] came to discuss [the defendant's] participation with [the other
defendants] in the distribution scheme." Id. at 885.
It should be pointed out that this rationale does not apply where the instances of conduct
are not sufficiently connected to constitute an indivisible transaction. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 2, 404[16], at 404-85 to 404-9 1, for other examples of using evidence
of other crimes to show "common plan or scheme."
136 It should be remembered, of course, that probative value is a function of the
probability that the other crime occurred as well as of the persuasive value of the relevant
inference. See note 33 supra.
137 See Dolan, supra note 7, at 233-35.
138 See notes 37-44supra and accompanying text.
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crimes evidence is weaker. Yet strong proof that the defendant com-
mitted the sporting goods store robbery, such as a witness' testimony
that the defendant admitted involvement in the robbery and taking
an unidentified pistol, would increase the probative value of this logi-
cally weak evidence on the issue of identity. It then follows that a
lesser degree of certainty should be required where the other crimes
evidence has high logical probative value, and more certainty is
needed as logical probative value diminishes.
3. The Modus Operandi Exception
In one category of cases where the evidence is logically very pro-
bative, the sliding scale cannot be adjusted because of the concur-
rence of probative value and prejudice. Where other crimes evidence
is sought to be introduced to establish the defendant's identity from
his modus operandi, there is no movement along the sliding scale.
Courts exclude other crimes evidence offered for this purpose unless
there is sufficient similarity between the uncharged offense and the
charged one to suggest that both are the defendant's handiwork.
1 39
These courts point out that the probative value of modus operandi
evidence increases with both its uniqueness and the degree of similar-
ity between the uncharged and the charged offense. 140 The more
unique the common facts of the modus operandi, the fewer features
needed to establish probity. The less unique, the greater number of
common features needed to establish the evidence as probative of
identity.141 Probative value in modus operandi cases is thus a func-
tion of uniqueness, degree of similarity, and proof of defendant's con-
nection with the uncharged offense. Recalling the discussion in
Section III of this article, it is clear that along with increasing uni-
queness and similarity, the elements of probative value in modus
operandi cases, comes increased prejudice.142
Since modus operandi evidence that warrants admission is likely
to generate a high degree of prejudice, the sliding scale demands
139 See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); see also C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 449.
140 In Myers, the court discussed this probative value standard stating that:
A much greater degree of similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged
crime is required when the evidence of the other crime is introduced to prove iden-
tity than when it is introduced to prove a state of mind. [Citations omitted.] We
have consistently held that for evidence of other crimes to be admissible the infer-
ence of identity flowing from it must be extremely strong.
550 F.2d at 1045.
141 Id.
142 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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greater proof that the defendant committed the other crimes than it
does when the evidence entails lower levels of prejudice. 143 Simulta-
neously, there is downward pressure on the sliding scale, generated
by the high logical probative value associated with the similarity and
uniqueness requirements of establishing identity by modus operandi.
More probative value is generated by each item of proof supporting
the defendant's commission of the other crime than would exist for
other crimes evidence that was less logically probative1l 4 In this
type of case, where both probative value and the risk of unfair
prejudice are increased by the similarity between unique charged
and uncharged offenses, the sliding scale is not adjusted downward as
in the normal case of high logical probative value. In the latter case,
risk of prejudice does not fluctuate with the probative value of the
evidence. 145 But where similarity and uniqueness increase both pro-
bative value and risk of prejudice, these balancing factors cancel
each other. Even though each item of proof produces more proba-
tive value, it simultaneously engenders more prejudice which it must
offset. The coincidence of high logical probative value and great
prejudice, both functions of the same elements of uniqueness and
similarity, results in no net movement or in a static scale of proof.
At the same time, once a connection has been made between the
defendant and the extrinsic offense, the evidence is practically con-
clusive on the issue of identity. The effective suspension of the sliding
scale calls for the application of a standard of proof that is sensitive
not only to risk of prejudice but also to the probative effect that mo-
dus operandi evidence is likely to have on the ultimate issue of iden-
tity. Since the sliding scale may not be helpful in this unusual case,
the standard must be based on other considerations. Because the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is generally applicable
to each element of the criminal offense, it is the ultimate standard by
which the quality of the evidence on each issue is tested. The factor
143 See text accompanying notes 46-48 su/ira.
144 See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text, concerning the effect of logical proba-
tive value on the certainty requirement.
145 See note 81 supra. Another category of other crimes cases where prejudice might in-
crease with probative value is intent cases, where the more similar the uncharged and charged
offenses, the more probative and prejudicial the evidence. See United States v. Beechum, 582
F.2d 898, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1978). Other crimes evidence to prove intent, however, may be
only generally similar-enough to infer the same state of mind for both the uncharged and
charged offenses-or identical. Compare United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.
1978), with United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1983).
The special analysis applicable in modus operandi would appear equally applicable
where intent evidence is identical to the charged offense.
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of need, generally considered at the initial balancing stage, 46 may
serve as a benchmark signaling the appropriate standard of certainty
for modus operandi evidence. 47 If the need for the evidence is high,
the standard of proof of the other crimes occurrence should be corre-
spondingly high. Perhaps the judge should be required to find that
the evidence would permit a jury finding of the existence of the other
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the need is marginal, yet suffi-
ciently great to avoid exclusion as merely cumulative, the standard of
proof should be lower. Accordingly, greater but not essential need
for the evidence would warrant an intermediate standard.
48
V. Conclusion
The Federal Rules of Evidence codified three well-established
rules of evidence law: (1) the admissibility of evidence of other
crimes, acts, or wrongs for a relevant non-character purpose in Rule
404(b); (2) the balancing of relevant evidence against the dangers of
unfair prejudice and other potential misuse under Rule 403; and (3)
the division of functions between the judge and the jury in deciding
preliminary questions of fact in Rule 104.
Courts have been aware in varying degrees of the interplay
among these three rules of evidence. However, one issue that has
been characterized by a lack of clear analysis is the determination
and use of an appropriate standard to decide the admissibility of
other crimes evidence. The problem arises because evidence of other
crimes may be admissible even if it has not been the subject of litiga-
tion. Without the proof of a supporting civil or criminal judgment,
the question of whether the present defendant actually perpetrated
the prior act may arise. This article has considered the proper ap-
proach to determining under the Federal Rules of Evidence the
amount of proof required to show that a criminal defendant commit-
ted another crime before such evidence may properly be admitted at
trial.
146 See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
147 If the factor of need has any implications for the standard of proof of other crimes, and
the writer contends that in the normal case it does not, it would seem to require higher
certainty when the need for the evidence is great. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970),
for the Supreme Court's perception, in the context of the confrontation clause, of the relation-
ship between the importance of evidence and concerns about its reliability.
148 It should be remembered that any standard is easier to meet where there are multiple




Before the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Beechum,'149
courts uniformly employed labels such as "preponderance of the evi-
dence," "clear and convincing evidence," or "plain clear and con-
vincing evidence" to determine the amount of scrutiny to which
judges should subject proof of other crimes. In Beechum, the court
pointed out that the question of other crimes proof was one of condi-
tional relevancy requiring only a judicial determination of "suffi-
ciency" to support a jury finding that the act was committed by the
defendant.150 The court also pointed out that the balancing require-
ment under Rule 403 is the same for relevant other crimes evidence
as it is for any relevant evidence where the possibility of unfair
prejudice requires it. Having struck two blows at eliminating judi-
cial confusion about the role of judges in passing upon the adequacy
of other crimes proof, the Beechum court failed to deliver the third.
When, if ever, is it necessary for a judge ruling on admissibility
to consider the adequacy of proof beyond the finding of prima facie
support for a jury finding mandated by Rule 104(b)? The answer is
that this second step is almost always required when a court consid-
ers the admissibility of other crimes evidence. While the question of
proof is one of conditional relevancy in the area of other crimes, this
evidence is unique because of its potential for prejudice. The judge is
thus nearly always called upon by Rule 403 to weigh the probative
value of other crimes evidence against its danger of unfair prejudice
and other potential misuse.
Probative value, on the other hand, is inter alia a function of the
amount of proof that the criminal defendant committed the other
crime-the more certainty that the defendant did the other act, the
higher the evidence's probative value. Since the prejudice of admissi-
ble evidence cannot substantially outweigh its probative value under
Rule 403, the standard of proof for balancing is tied to the danger of
prejudice created by the evidence. A sliding scale of proof thus is
necessary to accommodate the varying degrees of prejudice created
by a kaleidoscope of other crimes evidence. The sliding scale
presented here rationalizes unarticulated judicial behavior in the
area of admitting evidence of other crimes. It also provides a useful
tool for deciding the myriad cases of other crimes admissibility, in-
cluding those presenting special problems of proof.
149 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
150 Id. at 913.
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